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SOLVING THE RIDDLE! BRIDGING THE GAP IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DEFINITION OF
“REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS” TO
PREVENT PATENT TROLLS FROM FORUM SHOPPING
Michael A. Morales*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Non-practicing entities, more commonly referred to as patent
trolls, own patents and enforce them against other entities without
practicing the underlying patented inventions themselves. 1 Although
this conduct complies with the United States patent laws, patent trolls
manipulate and exploit many weaknesses in the system, such as
threatening litigation to extract licensing fees and forum shopping to
provide procedural litigation advantages. 2 The differing opinions of
the various district courts regarding venue disputes in patent
infringement cases enable patent trolls to use forum shopping as a
*J.D. Candidate 2019, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. in Electrical and
Computer Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute. I would like to give a special thanks
to my wife, Kerry, for her infinite love and support throughout my law school career. I would
also like to thank my family and friends for motivating me to pursue my dreams and the Touro
Law Review for allowing me to develop strong legal writing skills and electing me as the
Editor-in-Chief for the 2018-2019 school year. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to
give a special thanks to my Notes Editor, Patryk Rogowski, and my faculty advisor, Professor
Rena Seplowitz, for their endless support, encouragement, and guidance throughout the entire
writing process.
1
Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, and Patent Reform, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113, 115 (2015). An entity practices an invention when it “makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells [its] patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States [its] patented invention . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2016).
2 Grace Heinecke, Pay the Troll Toll: The Patent Troll Model is Fundamentally at Odds
with the Patent System’s Goals of Innovation and Competition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1153,
1155 (2015). “[P]atent trolls . . . use the patents to ‘extort some money’ from companies that
actually make things.” Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the
“Patent Troll” Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 435 (2014).
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litigation weapon. 3 The exploitation of the patent system causes
companies to allocate resources to defensive litigation strategies
instead of developing new technology and fostering innovation, which
directly conflicts with Congress’s goal for implementing the patent
system. 4 Thus, it is no surprise that the overwhelming attitude among
legal scholars towards patent trolls is that “[e]veryone seems to hate
‘[them].’” 5
Although patent trolls have manipulated the United States
patent system, one way to discourage and prevent them from
exploiting the weaknesses in the system, and ultimately harming
innovation, is through the combination of reasoned policy analysis and
patent venue reform. 6 For many years, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas has provided a haven for patent trolls
to bring patent infringement lawsuits because it tends to favor patentowners. 7 Therefore, patent trolls typically file patent infringement
lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas instead of other more
convenient districts to increase their likelihood of a favorable
outcome. 8 Such forum shopping, which is part of the patent troll
business model, provides a litigation advantage to a party in a patent
infringement lawsuit. 9
3

See Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80.
Heinecke, supra note 2. Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
5 Osenga, supra note 2, at 437 (emphasis added).
6 See Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 35 (2017); see also
Osenga, supra note 2, at 438.
7 Patrick H.J. Hughes, Attorneys Weigh in on Impact of Federal Circuit Patent Venue
Ruling, WESTLAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAILY BRIEFING, Sept. 28, 2017, 2017 WL
4295782. In fact, “East Texas saw more patent suits since 2014 than the districts that contain
California’s Silicon Valley, Massachusetts’ Route 128, Detroit’s Automation Alley, Illinois’
Golden Corridor, and North Carolina’s Research Triangle.” Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 7.
According to Lex Machina, between 2014 and mid-2016, the Eastern District of Texas saw
4,736 patent suits, while the Northern District of California saw 595 patent suits, the District
of Massachusetts saw 154, the Eastern District of Michigan saw 159, the Northern District of
Illinois saw 448, and the Middle and Eastern Districts of North Carolina collectively saw 79.
Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 7 n.22.
8 Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 7.
9 Patrick H.J. Hughes, Supreme Court Might End Texas’ Preferred Patent Venue Status,
Attorneys Say (U.S.), WESTLAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAILY BRIEFING, Dec. 20, 2016,
2016 WL 7362601 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16–341), 2017 WL 510981, at *9 (explaining that “[w]hile forum
4
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This Note will argue that courts should apply venue law in a
manner that limits a litigant’s ability to forum shop for a favorable
forum, such as the Eastern District of Texas, in patent infringement
lawsuits. This Note will propose several factors that courts should use
to determine whether a party has filed a patent infringement lawsuit in
a proper venue according to the patent venue statute. 10 It will explain
why each factor limits a patent troll’s ability to forum shop, thereby
fostering innovation and supporting Congress’s goal for implementing
the patent system. 11
This Note will be divided into nine sections. Section II will
provide an overview of the application of the patent venue statute.
Section III will explain Congress’s intent when it enacted the patent
venue statute. Section IV will discuss the Federal Circuit’s analysis of
the regular and established place of business requirement for venue
purposes, including a discussion of its decisions in In re Cordis Corp.12
and In re Cray Inc. 13 Section V will analyze factual considerations
that courts should use to determine whether a defendant has a physical
place of business in a district within the meaning of the Federal
Circuit’s definition. Section VI will discuss facts that courts should
consider to determine whether a defendant’s place of business is
regular. Section VII will evaluate factual considerations that courts
should use to determine whether a defendant’s place of business is
established. Section VIII will analyze factual inquiries that courts
should consider in addition to the Federal Circuit’s factors presented
in In re Cray. Finally, Section IX will conclude that the courts should
apply venue law uniformly to prevent patent trolls from forum
shopping.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PATENT VENUE
STATUTE

Venue for patent infringement cases is codified in 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b), 14 which provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent
shopping in general impairs the operation of law, disadvantages those who lack the resources
to engage in forum shopping, and creates economic waste, . . . the rise of the troll business
model exacerbates these problems in patent litigation . . . .” (citation omitted))).
10 See discussion of factual considerations infra Sections V-VIII.
11 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
12 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See discussion of this case infra Section IV(A).
13 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See discussion of this case infra Section IV(B)(2).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016).
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infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”15
For over twenty-five years, in accordance with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding Corp. v.
Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 16 courts consistently held that a defendant
resided in any judicial district where the defendant is subject to the
court’s personal jurisdiction. 17 Therefore, under this interpretation of
the patent venue law, patent trolls forum shopped for patent-owner
friendly forums, such as the Eastern District of Texas, merely by
arguing that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 18
On May 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands
LLC, 19 in which it held that a defendant resides only in its state of
incorporation. 20 Under this change in the law, a defendant corporation
resides in any judicial district in its state of incorporation rather than
in any judicial district where the defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction. 21 Therefore, in the wake of TC Heartland, if a
defendant corporation is not incorporated in the state in which a
plaintiff files a patent infringement lawsuit, then a court must establish
a proper venue by determining where the defendant corporation has
15

Id. (emphasis added).
917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abrogated by TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp.
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
17 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1580 (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) supplemented §
1400(b) and, for venue purposes in patent infringement cases, a court is a proper venue if the
court has personal jurisdiction over the parties). General venue provisions are codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c), which provides that “an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its
common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside,
if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2016)
(emphasis added).
18 The Eastern District of Texas’s popularity stems from its reputation for cases proceeding
to trial quickly, which in turn allows plaintiffs to recover damages faster while placing greater
pressure on defendants to settle. Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 13. In addition, the Eastern
District of Texas is home to judges and jurors who are unusually sympathetic to plaintiffs.
Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 15. The Eastern District of Texas’s popularity also stems from
the combined effect of a number of marginal procedural advantages, including the relative
timing of discovery, rulings on procedural motions, and judicial scrutiny of infringement
claims. Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 21.
19 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
20 Id. at 1521 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) does not supplement 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
for patent venue purposes).
21 Id. See also In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating “[w]e
conclude that TC Heartland changed the controlling law . . . .”).
16
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committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place
of business in a judicial district. 22 The Supreme Court’s decision in
TC Heartland reined in patent trolls and limited their ability to forum
shop. 23
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland, courts
rarely determined whether a defendant had a regular and established
place of business in a judicial district because, relying on the Federal
Circuit’s holding in VE Holding, courts often determined a proper
venue based on where the defendant resided. 24 Therefore, a large gap
in the law existed for determining whether a defendant had a regular
and established place of business in a judicial district. 25 For over thirty
years, district courts struggled to apply venue law uniformly in
accordance with the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Cordis, the
Federal Circuit’s only decision which provided guidance on the
issue. 26 In the recent decision of In re Cray, the Federal Circuit
analyzed the statutory framework of the “regular and established place
of business” requirement of the patent venue statute and provided
guidance for courts to use going forward. 27
In In re Cray, the Federal Circuit held that there are three
general requirements to determine whether a defendant corporation has
a regular and established place of business in a judicial district. 28 First,
there must be a physical place of business in the district. 29 Second, the
22

See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016).
See Larry Downes, The U.S. Supreme Court Is Reining in Patent Trolls, Which Is a Win
for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/the-u-s-supremecourt-is-reining-in-patent-trolls-which-is-a-win-for-innovation.
24 In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that venue in patent
infringement cases has largely turned on whether a defendant resides in the district in
question).
25 Id. (discussing that district courts have noted the uncertainty surrounding and the need
for greater uniformity on the issue of whether a defendant has a regular and established place
of business).
26 Id. (citing In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736-37). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of a district court
of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to
patents . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2016). Congress formed the Federal Circuit to clear up
existing conflicts in the patent law decisions of the circuit courts of appeals and to develop a
body of law to instruct district courts in the proper application of the patent laws. Donald R.
Dunner, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its Critical Role in the
Revitalization of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence, Past, Present, and Future, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
775, 781 (2010). See discussion of the Federal Circuit infra Section IV.
27 See generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355.
28 Id. at 1360.
29 Id.
23
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physical place of business must be regular and established. 30 Third,
the regular and established place of business must be the place of the
defendant. 31 In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the facts did
not support a finding that Cray had a place of business under the third
requirement because there was no indication that Cray owned, leased,
or rented any portion of its sales executives’ homes in the judicial
district. 32 Although this case is very helpful in guiding district courts
to apply venue law uniformly, the court did not specifically apply the
first two requirements to the facts of the case. 33 In contrast with the
third requirement, the court did not discuss factors that courts should
use to determine whether the place of business is “physical,” “regular,”
and “established.” 34 As such, with district courts attempting to resolve
venue disputes in the wake of TC Heartland, it has become
increasingly necessary for courts to uniformly determine whether a
defendant corporation has a physical, regular, and established place of
business in a district.
Regarding the physical place of business requirement, courts
should consider whether a defendant operates solely through virtual
means. 35 Courts should also consider whether a defendant has a standalone business office or employs a secretarial service in the district. 36
On the other hand, whether a defendant registers as a foreign
corporation or appoints an agent to accept service of process should
not be factored into a court’s analysis. 37
Regarding the regular and established requirements, courts
should split the analysis for regular place of business from the analysis
for established place of business because the Federal Circuit defined

30

Id.
Id.
32 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1366. See discussion of facts infra Section IV(B)(2).
33 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1366.
34 Id. at 1362-64.
35 See analysis of this factor infra Section V (A). Although courts have not specifically
analyzed the phrase “virtual means” for patent venue purposes, courts hesitate to find that a
defendant has a regular and established place of business in a district if the defendant sells
products or services through online stores only. See Talsk Research Inc. v. Evernote Corp.,
No. 16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017). This result is proper
because the Federal Circuit has determined that the place of business must be a physical,
geographical location in the district from which the defendant conducts business. See In re
Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
36 See analysis of this factor infra Section V(B).
37 See analysis of this factor infra Section V(C). Consideration of these factors conflates
the issues of venue with personal jurisdiction. See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361.
31
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the terms “regular” and “established” differently. 38 To determine
whether a defendant has a regular place of business in a district, courts
should consider how long the defendant has spent in the district as well
as the number of times per year that the defendant spends in the district
conducting business. 39 To determine whether a defendant has an
established place of business in a district, courts should consider the
defendant’s revenue generated in the district, the time that the
defendant has spent in the district, and the number of employees that
the defendant has employed in the district. 40 On the other hand, courts
should not evaluate whether the defendant’s employees service
customers at the customer’s location. 41
Regarding the defendant’s place of business requirement, in
addition to the requirements that the Federal Circuit discussed in In re
Cray, courts should also consider whether the place of business in
question is the place of the defendant or the defendant’s subsidiary. 42
On the other hand, whether the defendant lists its employee’s home as
the place of business on a worker’s compensation insurance policy
should not be factored into a court’s analysis. 43 Although a defendant
might store its products in its employee’s home, courts should not
consider this factor to be determinative. 44
Courts should continue to rein in patent trolls by uniformly
applying patent venue law to prevent them from using forum shopping
as a litigation advantage. Companies sued by patent trolls must
allocate resources to defensive strategies–funds that otherwise could
be spent on developing technology instead of threatened litigation.45
Without litigation spending, companies can invest more in research
and development to create new patentable inventions, thereby

38 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362-63 (defining regular as “‘steady[,] uniform[,] orderly[,
and] methodical’ manner” and defining established as “settle[d] certainly, or fix[ed]
permanently”). Courts should split the analysis to avoid redundancy and conflating the
requirements of each term because the Federal Circuit has defined the terms separately.
39 See analysis of this factor infra Section VI(A)-VI(B).
40 See analysis of this factor infra Section VII(B), VII(E).
41 See analysis of this factor infra Section VII(C). A court should find that the defendant’s
business is not established in the district if the defendant leaves the district because its presence
is not fixed permanently. See analysis of this factor infra Section VII(A).
42 See analysis of this factor infra Section VIII(B).
43 See analysis of this factor infra Section VIII(C).
44 See analysis of this factor infra Section VIII(A). See discussion of In re Cray infra
Section IV(B)(2).
45 Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80.
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fostering innovation. 46 Under the analysis set forth in In re Cray,
district courts have wide discretion for determining a proper venue
because the Federal Circuit left large gaps in its analysis of the patent
venue laws. 47 These gaps permit district courts to have varying
opinions regarding whether a defendant has a physical, regular, and
established place of business in the district at issue. 48 The differing
opinions of the various district courts enable patent trolls to exploit the
patent system and use forum shopping as a litigation weapon, thereby
continuing to harm innovation. 49 By utilizing the factors analyzed in
this Note, courts can begin to apply patent venue law uniformly to
prevent patent trolls from exploiting this prevalent weakness in our
judicial system.
III.

28 U.S.C. 1400(B)’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
CONGRESS’S INTENT WHEN IT ENACTED THE “REGULAR
AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS” REQUIREMENT

In the late 1800s, when Congress was considering § 1400(b)’s
predecessor, 50 courts were divided over whether a defendant could be
sued for patent infringement outside the place of defendant’s
incorporation. 51 To resolve the uncertainty, Congress enacted §
1400(b)’s predecessor in 1897 to permit suit in the district of which the
defendant was an “inhabitant” or in which the defendant both
maintained a “regular and established place of business” and
committed an act of infringement. 52 The statute’s main purpose was
46

Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1180.
As mentioned, the Federal Circuit’s analysis in In re Cray guided courts, but it failed to
provide specific factual considerations that courts should use to determine if the defendant’s
place of business in a district is physical, regular, and established. See generally In re Cray,
871 F.3d at 1355.
48 See discussion of the shortcomings of the Federal Circuit’s test infra Section IV(B)(2).
49 See Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80.
50 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b)).
51 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360. Compare id. at 1360-61 (explaining that some courts held
that plaintiffs must bring suit in the defendant’s place of incorporation because “it is very
inconvenient to travel across the continent to sue them when they are infringing in a business
established near the plaintiff or owner of a patent.” (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 2695, 2719 (1897)
(statement by Sen. Platt)), with id. at 1361 (explaining that “[o]ther courts instead held that
[patent] infringement ‘suit[s] may be brought wherever service can be had.’” (quoting 29
CONG. REC. 1871, 1900 (1897) (statement of Rep. Mitchell)).
52 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b)).
47
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to “give original jurisdiction to the court where a permanent agency
transacting the business [was] located.” 53 Jurisdiction would not be
conferred by “[i]solated cases of infringement,” but “only where a
permanent agency [was] established.” 54
The Federal Circuit in In re Cray noted that “Congress adopted
the predecessor to § 1400(b) as a special venue statute in patent
infringement actions to eliminate the ‘abuses engendered’ by previous
venue provisions allowing such suits to be brought in any district in
which the defendant could be served.” 55 The legislation was “intended
to define the exact limits of venue in patent infringement suits.” 56 The
Supreme Court therefore has explained that Congress enacted the
statute as “a restrictive measure, limiting a prior, broader venue.” 57
The Supreme Court has also instructed that venue requirements are
specific and unambiguous and that courts should not give them a
liberal construction. 58
IV.

APPLICATION OF “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF
BUSINESS” IN FEDERAL COURTS

Prior to the formation of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, appellate review of patent cases took place in the
eleven different circuit courts of appeals. 59 The circuit courts’ widely
varying views of the patent laws encouraged patent litigators to race to
the courthouses of their choice in order to position their clients in the
circuit court most friendly to their clients’ interests. 60 This behavior
resulted in “an extremely inefficient and unfair administration of
justice in the patent law area, not to mention the total unpredictability
of patent jurisprudence, contingent on who reached the courthouse
first.” 61 Therefore, in the early 1980s, Congress formed the Federal
Circuit to clear up existing conflicts in the patent law decisions of the

53 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361 (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 1871, 1900 (1897) (statement of
Rep. Lacey)).
54 Id. (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 1871, 1900 (1897) (statement of Rep. Lacey)).
55 Id. (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262 (1961)).
56 Id. (quoting Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 566 (1942)).
57 Id. (quoting Stonite, 315 U.S. at 566).
58 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361 (citing Schnell, 365 U.S. at 264).
59 Dunner, supra note 26, at 777.
60 Dunner, supra note 26, at 777.
61 Dunner, supra note 26, at 777.
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circuit courts of appeals and to develop a body of law to instruct district
courts in the proper application of the patent laws. 62
In 1985, In re Cordis was the Federal Circuit’s first decision
addressing the issue of whether a defendant corporation has a regular
and established place of business in a judicial district. 63 However, In
re Cordis is viewed as merely persuasive, rather than authoritative,
because of its unique procedural posture and its focus on one fact in
the countless combinations of relevant factors. 64 The Federal Circuit
recently rendered another decision in In re Cray to help district courts
determine whether a defendant corporation has a regular and
established place of business in a judicial district. 65 This section will
discuss and analyze the Federal Circuit’s decisions in In re Cordis and
In re Cray and the shortcomings of each case.
A.

Federal Circuit’s Determination that a Defendant
Corporation has a Regular and Established Place of
Business if it has a “Continuous and Permanent
Presence” in the District

In In re Cordis, Medtronic Inc., a Minnesota corporation with
its principal place of business in Minneapolis, filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota alleging that
Cordis Corp., a Florida corporation with its principal place of business
in Miami, infringed four of Medtronic’s patents. 66 Cordis filed a
motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that Cordis did not
have a regular and established place of business in the District of
Minnesota. 67 However, the district court denied Cordis’s motion to
dismiss.68
62 Dunner, supra note 26. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States
. . . in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .” 28
U.S.C. 1295(a)(1) (2016).
63 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736.
64 Ron Vogel & Brian Coggio, Reviving ‘Regular And Established Place Of Biz’ Case Law,
LAW 360 (June 12, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/930354/revivingregular-and-established-place-of-biz-case-law (explaining that the case’s procedural posture
was unique because of the extraordinary nature of mandamus).
65 See generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355.
66 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 734.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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The district court found that Cordis employed two full-time
sales representatives, who worked exclusively for Cordis to market the
company’s pacemakers in Minnesota. 69 The two sales representatives
maintained their offices in their homes where they stored Cordis’s
literature, documents, and products. 70 Furthermore, they acted as
technical consultants who were present in the operating room during a
significant number of surgical implantations of Cordis’s pacemakers,
provided post-implantation consultations, and gave small
presentations regarding technological developments. 71 Cordis also
engaged a Minnesota secretarial service to receive messages, provide
typing services, mail Cordis’s literature, and receive shipments of
Cordis’s sales literature. 72 The Minnesota telephone directory
included Cordis’s name, telephone number and address. 73 However,
Cordis was not registered to do business in Minnesota, did not have a
bank account within the state, and did not own or lease an office space
within the state. 74
The district court denied Cordis’s motion to dismiss and found
that Cordis maintained a regular and established place of business in
Minnesota even though the two sales representatives did not perform
their sales functions from a fixed, physical location. 75 Cordis
challenged the district court’s finding because it did not rent or own a
fixed physical location within Minnesota. 76 Cordis petitioned the
Federal Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus to order the District of
Minnesota to transfer the case to a proper venue. 77 Pursuant to the All
Writs Act, 78 the Federal Circuit had the authority to issue the requested
writ as “necessary or appropriate in aid of [its jurisdiction].”79
However, “[t]he use of mandamus is limited to exceptional

69

Id. at 735.
Id.
71 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 735.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 737.
76 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 734.
77 Id.
78 All Writs Act, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 102 (1949) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).
79 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736 (quoting Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp.,
717 F.2d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
70
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circumstances to correct a ‘clear abuse of discretion or “usurpation of
judicial power”’ by a trial court.” 80
The Federal Circuit relied heavily on the decisions of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Phillips v. Baker 81 and the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in University of Illinois Foundation v.
Channel Master Corp. 82 to determine that Cordis had a regular and
established place of business in Minnesota. 83 The court reasoned that
these cases indicated that the “appropriate inquiry is whether the
corporate defendant does its business in a district through a permanent
and continuous presence” and not whether the corporate defendant has
a “fixed physical presence in the sense of a formal office or store.”84
If a “rational and substantial legal argument can be made in support of
the rule in question, the case is not appropriate for mandamus, even
though on normal appeal, a court might find reversible error.” 85 The
court found that Medtronic made a rational and substantial legal
argument in support of the district court’s order to deny Cordis’s
motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue. 86
The Federal Circuit used a clear abuse of discretion standard of
review because Cordis petitioned the Federal Circuit to issue a writ of
mandamus to order the district court to transfer the case to a proper
venue. 87 If Cordis had instead appealed the case after the district
court’s decision on the merits, the outcome might have been different
because the Federal Circuit would have likely reviewed the appeal
using a de novo standard. 88 If the case had been reviewed de novo, the
80 Id. (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953) (quoting De
Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945))).
81 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941). See discussion of the case infra Section VI(A).
82 382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967).
83 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736-37.
84 Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 736.
88 See In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737. When legal error is at issue, the standard of review is
de novo, and the Federal Circuit gives the trial court little, if any, deference as to any
presumption of legal correctness. Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the
Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B. J. 279, 285 (2002) (citing Superior
Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress
Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The most lenient standard of
review is abuse of discretion, which “may be found when: (1) the tribunal’s decision is clearly
unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) the decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of
law; (3) the tribunal’s findings are clearly erroneous; or (4) the record contains no evidence
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court might have analyzed the issue further. Instead of explaining that
the appropriate inquiry is whether a defendant has a permanent and
continuous presence in a district, 89 the court might have set forth a
comprehensive framework for determining whether a defendant has a
regular and established place of business in a district. The Federal
Circuit’s decision failed to apply its new rule of law from In re Cordis
to the facts because it did not specifically explain how Cordis’s actions
in the district amounted to a continuous and permanent presence
there. 90 It would have been more helpful for the court to go beyond
simply explaining its rule of law by applying the rule of law to the facts
and discussing its reasoning for doing so. Instead, the court left it up
to the district courts in future cases to determine whether a defendant
conducts its business in a district through a permanent and continuous
presence. 91 Consequently, district courts have struggled to apply the
Federal Circuit’s new rule of law uniformly. 92
B.

Federal Circuit Defines a Regular and Established
Place of Business but Leaves Gaps in its Analysis

In Raytheon Co. v. Cray Inc., 93 the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, but the
court denied the motion finding that the defendant had a regular and
established place of business in the judicial district based on Judge
Gilstrap’s newly created four factor test. 94 After the court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss, Cray petitioned the Federal Circuit to

upon which the tribunal rationally could have based its decision.” Id. at 286 (citing Abrutyn
v. Giovanniello, 15 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1994); W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc.,
860 F.2d 428 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)).
89 See In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737.
90 See id. at 736-37.
91 See generally id. at 733.
92 Compare Holub Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 853 (4th Cir. 1961) (suggesting that
a prerequisite to being considered a regular and established place of business is that the
defendant must have a physical presence, such as an office or warehouse, in the district), with
Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (requiring that the
defendant must regularly engage “in carrying on a substantial part of its ordinary business on
a permanent basis in a physical location within the district over which it exercises some
measure of control.”).
93 258 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2017), vacated by In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1357.
94 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799. See discussion of Judge Gilstrap’s factor test infra
Section IV(B)(1).
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issue a writ of mandamus to order the Eastern District of Texas to
transfer the case. 95
1.

Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc.: The District
Court Opinion

Cray had one sales executive working in the Eastern District of
Texas for more than seven years and listed the sales executive as the
“Named Account Manager” there. 96 In addition, the sales executive
listed his telephone number on Cray’s invoices to customers and
emails to clients, and the telephone number’s area code was associated
with several counties in the Eastern District of Texas. 97 The revenue
attributed to the sales executive exceeded $345 million, and the sales
executive received reimbursement for his cellphone used for business
purposes, internet fees, mileage and various costs he incurred for
business travel. 98 Unlike Cordis in In re Cordis, Cray did not pay for
any secretarial staff in the district; rather, the sales executive received
direct administrative support from Cray’s Minnesota office to allow
the sales executive to continue to work from his home office in the
Eastern District of Texas. 99
Before the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding, most
courts had developed competing and conflicting interpretations of the
regular and established place of business element of § 1400(b). 100 One
line of cases held, or at least suggested, that an established place of
business required a physical presence in the district. 101 In fact, some
of these courts held that the physical presence needed to be on land
that the defendant owned, leased, or controlled. 102 Other courts
required that the physical presence be a “substantial part” of the
defendant’s business. 103 The other line of cases found that proper
venue did not require a physical presence in the district but that a
95

In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1356.
Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 785.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 792 (explaining that in Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 681 F. Supp. 959, 962 (D. Mass.
1987), courts hoped for greater uniformity after the creation of the Federal Circuit).
101 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 792 (citing Holub, 290 F.2d at 853, Gen. Radio Co. v.
Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1961), and Phillips, 121 F.2d at 752).
102 Id. (citing Johnston, 681 F. Supp. at 962).
103 Id. See Mastantuono, 184 F. Supp. at 178. See also Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Kransco Mfg.,
Inc., 247 F. Supp. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
96
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defendant’s employee, operating out of his or her home, could
constitute a regular and established place of business. 104
In light of the courts’ split in applying patent venue law, Judge
Gilstrap created a four factor test to help courts ascertain coverage
under the statutory scheme. 105 His test included determining the extent
to which (1) “a defendant has a physical presence in the district,” 106 (2)
“a defendant represents that it has a presence in the district,” 107 (3) “a
defendant derives benefits from its presence in the district,” 108 and (4)
“a defendant interacts in a targeted way with entities in the district.”109
He explained that his test did not supplant the statutory language of §
1400(b) and stated that none of the factors should alone be
dispositive. 110 He opined that courts should consider other realities
present in individual cases based upon fair consideration of the totality
of the circumstances and not by a bright-line test. 111 Although Judge
Gilstrap discussed each of the four factors of his test, he did not apply
each factor to the facts of Raytheon or explain how each factor weighed

104 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 792 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F.
Supp. 1412, 1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983) and Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. Waters Assocs.,
Inc., No. 76 C 4340, 1977 WL 22810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 1977)).
105 Id. at 795-96. Although district courts typically interpret Federal Circuit opinions for
patent venue disputes, seeing an opportunity to revitalize a dormant area of patent venue
jurisprudence, Judge Gilstrap created the new test to “employ analytical methods for
establishing patent venue which are rooted in the wisdom of the past, but which also embrace
the future’s changes.” Id. at 799.
106 Id. at 796-97 (explaining that “[a]t the most basic level, a retail store, warehouse, or other
facility in the district weighs strongly in favor of finding a regular and established place of
business” and that “[f]acts supporting a physical presence could also include the presence of
equipment or infrastructure that is owned (or leased) by a defendant and used to provide
services to customers.”).
107 Id. at 797-98 (discussing that a defendant that “accept[s] a . . . representative’s office as
one of its own places of business based on, among other things, the advertising that [the]
defendant permitted regarding that location and the fact that the defendant naturally expected
customer inquiries to be directed toward its agent there” weighs in favor of finding that a
defendant has a regular and established place of business in a district).
108 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 798 (explaining that “[c]ourts have often looked to the
benefits a defendant has received from its business in a particular district as a factor supporting
a regular and established place of business, especially where a defendant has generated
significant revenue from such business.”).
109 Id. (discussing that courts should look for localized customer support, ongoing
contractual relationships, or targeted marketing efforts).
110 Id. at 795, 799.
111 Id. at 799.
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in his analysis. 112 He merely concluded that venue was proper in the
case after explaining the four factors of his newly created test. 113
2. In re Cray, Inc.: The Federal Circuit’s Opinion
After Judge Gilstrap’s denial of the defendant’s motion to
dismiss in Raytheon, Cray petitioned the Federal Circuit to issue a writ
of mandamus to order Judge Gilstrap to transfer the case to a proper
venue. 114 Mandamus is appropriate to decide issues important to
proper judicial administration, and the Supreme Court has approved
the use of mandamus to decide a basic and undecided legal question
when the trial court abused its discretion by applying incorrect law.115
The court reasoned that Judge Gilstrap misunderstood the scope and
effect of the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Cordis. 116 There was a
need for greater uniformity on the issue, and the court saw an
opportunity to clarify the regular and established place of business
requirement in this case. 117
The Federal Circuit found that the
[T]hree general requirements relevant to the inquiry
[are]: (1) there must be a physical place in the district;
(2) it must be a regular and established place of
business; and (3) it must be the place of the
defendant. 118

112

See generally id. at 781.
Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799. Judge Gilstrap analogized this case to In re Cordis in
several ways but never applied the four factors to the facts of the case. See id. Similar to the
sales representative in In re Cordis, he explained that the sales executive in this case worked
exclusively for defendant for several years and did not limit his activity to sales only. Id. at
794. Although the sales executive did not have samples or products stored at his home, he
could not because the supercomputer systems could take up entire rooms and weigh thousands
of pounds. Id.
114 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1356.
115 Id. at 1358-59. At the outset of the opinion, the court discussed the legally relevant facts
and explained that mandamus was reserved for exceptional circumstances and appropriately
issued when there is a usurpation of judicial power or a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 135759.
116 Id. at 1359. The court acknowledged that the Federal Circuit did not evaluate venue in
light of the statutory language of § 1400(b) and decided the case based only on its specific
facts. Id.
117 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1359-60.
118 Id. at 1360. The Federal Circuit cautioned district courts to be mindful of the statute’s
history and to be careful not to conflate the factors for establishing venue in patent cases with
the factors for establishing personal jurisdiction or general venue. Id. at 1361 (explaining that
113
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The pertinent noun in § 1400(b) is “place,” while “regular” and
“established” are adjectives that modify it. 119 The court explained that
words “of business” indicated the nature and purpose of the “place”
and the words “the defendant” indicated that the “place” must be the
defendant’s. 120 The court reasoned that § 1400(b) requires that “a
defendant has” a “place of business” that is “regular” and
“established.” 121
Regarding its first requirement, the court explained that a
“place” is “[a] building or a part of a building set apart for any purpose”
or “quarters of any kind” from which business is conducted. 122 The
“place” component of the definition need not be a fixed, physical
location in the sense of a formal office or store, but must “be a physical,
geographical location in the district from which the business of the
defendant is carried out.” 123 A place does not include a virtual space
or electronic communications from one person to another. 124
Regarding the second requirement, the court defined a business
as “regular” if it operates in a “steady[,] uniform[,] orderly[, and]
methodical” manner. 125 However, sporadic activity does not establish
venue. 126 The court explained that “[t]he doing of a single act
pertaining to a particular business will not be considered engaging in
or carrying on the business; yet a series of such acts would be so
considered.” 127
The court explained that “established” means that the
defendant’s place of business is “settle[d] certainly,” “fixed
permanently,” or “not transient.” 128 The court also explained that a
defendant only has a temporary presence in a district when it

the regular and established place of business standard requires more than the minimum
contacts necessary for establishing personal jurisdiction or for satisfying the doing business
standard of the general venue provision).
119 Id. at 1361-62.
120 Id. at 1362.
121 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
122 Id.
123 Id. (quoting In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737). See discussion of In re Cordis supra Section
IV(A).
124 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1363. To make “permanent” clearly accords with the “main purpose” identified
in the predecessor statute’s legislative history. In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
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semiannually displays its products at a trade show. 129 On the other
hand, a business’s five-year continuous presence in the district satisfies
the established requirement for venue purposes. 130 While a business
can move its location, it must be stable for a meaningful period. 131
Regarding the third requirement, the court articulated that the
“place of business” must be of the defendant, not solely a place of the
defendant’s employee. 132 Since employees can freely move their
homes out of the district without the defendant’s approval, the
defendant must establish or ratify the employee’s place as defendant’s
place of business. 133 Relevant considerations include whether the
defendant owns, leases or exercises control over the place. 134 Other
factors that might satisfy this requirement include whether the
defendant conditioned employment on an employee’s continued
residence in the district or whether the employee stores materials at the
place to allow distribution or sale from there. 135
The court adopted the second factor of Judge Gilstrap’s venue
test 136 and noted that an important consideration is how the defendant
represents itself in the district. 137 The defendant’s marketing or
advertising activities may also be relevant, but only to the extent that
it indicates that the defendant itself holds a place of business in the
district. 138 The court opined that the mere fact that a defendant
advertised a place of business or set up an office is not itself sufficient;
the defendant must take an extra step and actually engage in business
from that location. 139 In addition, other relevant factors include
whether the defendant lists the alleged place of business on a website,
in a telephone or other directory, or places its name on a sign associated

129 Id. (explaining the holding in Knapp–Monarch Co. v. Casco Prods. Corp., 342 F.2d 622,
625 (7th Cir. 1965)).
130 Id. (explaining the holding in Remington Rand Bus. Serv. v. Acme Card Sys. Co., 71
F.2d 628, 629 (4th Cir. 1934)).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 The second factor of Judge Gilstrap’s venue test turned on defendant’s representations
that it has a presence in the district. Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 797-98.
137 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. See discussion of Judge Gilstrap’s test supra Section
IV(B)(1).
138 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
139 Id.
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with the building itself. 140 Another consideration may be the nature
and activity of the alleged place of business in the district in
comparison with that of defendant’s other places of business in other
venues. 141
In applying the court’s definitions to this case, the court turned
to the third requirement that the place of business be of the defendant
and not the defendant’s employee. 142 The court found that the sales
executive’s home was not Cray’s place of business because there was
no indication that Cray owned, leased, or rented any portion of the
sales executive’s homes in the Eastern District of Texas, played a part
in selecting the place’s location, stored inventory or conducted
demonstrations there, or conditioned the sales executive’s employment
on an Eastern District of Texas location. 143 Therefore, the court held
that venue did not exist under § 1400(b) because the facts, taken as a
whole, did not support a finding that Cray maintained a place of
business in the Eastern District of Texas. 144
The Federal Circuit used a clear abuse of discretion standard of
review instead of a de novo standard because Cray petitioned the
Federal Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus to order the Eastern
District of Texas to transfer the case to a proper venue. 145 Although
the court defined several terms of the statute, such as “place,”
“regular,” and “established,” the court failed to articulate specific
factual considerations that are relevant for each of these elements of
the venue statute. 146 For example, regarding the first requirement, the
court did not define a virtual space or discuss any relevant factual
considerations for determining whether a place of business is virtual or
physical. 147 In addition, regarding the second requirement, the court
did not discuss any relevant facts that courts should consider when
determining whether the place of business is “regular” or
140

Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1364 (explaining that “we do not suggest that district courts must scrutinize the
nature and activity of the alleged place of business to make relative value judgments on the
different types of business activity conducted therein. Rather, a relative comparison of the
nature and activity may reveal, for example, that a defendant has a business model whereby
many employees’ homes are used by the business as a place of business of the defendant.”).
142 Id. at 1364.
143 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1365.
144 Id. at 1366.
145 Id. at 1359. The procedural posture of In re Cray was similar to the procedural posture
in In re Cordis. See discussion of In re Cordis supra Section IV(A).
146 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1364-65.
147 See id.
141
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“established.” 148 In fact, the court separately defined the terms
“regular” and “established,” but did not explain factual considerations
to determine whether a place of business is “regular” as opposed to
“established.” 149 Courts often combined these two factual inquiries
even though the two terms have different meanings. 150 It would have
been very helpful for the court to apply its newly defined requirements
to the facts of the case. However, because the court focused primarily
on the third requirement, the court left open several gaps in the
standards that courts should apply for determining whether a defendant
has a regular and established place of business in a judicial district. 151
V.

DEFINING A “PHYSICAL PLACE OF BUSINESS”

As the Federal Circuit discussed in In re Cray, the first
requirement is that there must be a physical place of business in the
district. 152 Although the court discussed this requirement, it did not
discuss relevant facts that courts could use to determine whether a
defendant’s presence in the district meets the physical place of
business requirement. 153 To determine whether a defendant has a
physical place of business in a district, courts should consider whether
a defendant operates solely through virtual means. 154 Courts should
also consider whether a defendant has a stand-alone business office in
the district 155 or whether a defendant employs a secretarial service in
the district. 156 On the other hand, whether a defendant registers as a
foreign corporation or appoints an agent to accept service of process
should not be considered. 157 This section will analyze and discuss
factors that courts should consider to determine whether a defendant
has a physical place of business in a district.

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

See id.
See id.
See discussion of the factual inquiries infra Sections VI and VII.
See generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355.
Id. at 1360.
See id.; see also discussion of the shortcomings of In re Cray supra Section IV(B)(2).
See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(A).
See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(B).
See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(C).
See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(D).
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A. Businesses Operating Solely through Virtual Means
In Talsk Research Inc. v. Evernote Corp., 158 the court held that
the defendant did not have a physical place of business in the district
because its only interaction with the district was by selling its software
products over the internet through virtual stores, such as Google Play
and the Apple App Store, rather than in a physical retail store. 159
Although the court in Talsk provided little reasoning to support its
finding, 160 the case indicates that a defendant that sells products over
the internet does not have a physical place of business because virtual
stores, such as Google Play and the Apple App Store, are not
“building[s]” or “quarters of any kind” from which a defendant
conducts business as required by the Federal Circuit’s definition of the
term “place.” 161
For clarification, courts should define virtual space as a
medium located in no particular geographical location used to conduct
business. 162 This definition comports with Congress’s intent because
it makes the virtual space definition more exact, specific and
unambiguous. 163 Furthermore, it coincides with the Federal Circuit’s
requirement that the place of business must “be a physical,
geographical location in the district from which the business of the
defendant is carried out.” 164 By using this definition of virtual space,
patent trolls can be restricted from bringing suit against a defendant in
a district based only on the defendant’s virtual presence in the district,
158

No. 16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017).
Id. at *2. See also Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-CivScola, 2017 WL 5032989, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that
the defendant’s dealers in the district constituted defendant’s physical place of business
because the dealers sign up online and their places of business are the defendant’s).
160 Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2-5.
161 See id. at *2. See also In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
162 See Schnell, 365 U.S. at 264; see also Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997)
(explaining the definition of cyberspace).
163 For example, if a court finds that a defendant sells products through a physical store,
then the court can refer to a physical, tangible place of business. If a court finds that a
defendant sells products through a medium located in no particular geographical location, such
as Google Play or the Apple App Store, then the court can determine that the defendant
conducts business through a virtual space. See Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2.
164 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362 (quoting In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737). See discussion of
In re Cordis supra Section IV(A). The current distinction between virtual space and physical
location promotes the goals of patent law because courts can more easily define the exact
limits of a physical place of business. By doing so, courts can more uniformly determine
whether a defendant has a physical place of business in the district, which limits a party’s
ability to forum shop for a favorable forum.
159
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such as the defendant’s online advertising and online stores. 165 Such a
restriction eliminates a patent troll’s ability to bring suit in any district
in which a defendant could be served, which directly supports the
intent that Congress had when it enacted the patent venue statute. 166 In
addition, by using this definition of virtual space, courts can uniformly
decide patent venue disputes dealing with virtual spaces, thereby
limiting a patent troll’s ability to use forum shopping as a litigation
weapon. By limiting forum shopping, companies can allocate
resources towards fostering innovation instead of defensive litigation
strategies, which directly comports with Congress’s goal for
implementing the patent system. 167
The distinction between physical and virtual spaces is still
viable considering that developments in technology over the last few
decades, including computer enhancements and widespread internet
use, have changed the way society communicates and conducts
business. 168 In Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc., 169 the plaintiff
filed a patent infringement suit against the defendant in the Eastern
District of Texas. 170 Defendant sold surveillance computers to
billboard owners to track billboard structural integrity and detect
defects as they arose. 171 The surveillance computers wirelessly
reported wear-and-tear to the defendant, which enabled the defendant
to oversee and control billboards across large areas. 172 The plaintiff
argued that the defendant maintained a commercial presence in the
Eastern District of Texas sufficient for patent venue purposes because
the defendant controlled nearly two thousand billboards and used
wireless communication to control light, voltage, outage notifications,
and power restoration of the billboards through the surveillance
computers. 173 In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the court reasoned
that the defendant’s physical offices were located outside of the district
165

See Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2.
See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361. See also discussion of Congress’s intent when it
enacted § 1400(b) supra Section III.
167 See Heinecke, supra note 2.
168 See Brianne M. Sullenger, Telecommuting: A Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act as Technology Advances, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 537, 537
(2007).
169 No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL 5068348 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017).
170 Id. at *1.
171 Id. at *2.
172 Id. (discussing that the defendant monitored about two thousand billboards through
nearly one thousand surveillance computers in the district).
173 Id. at *4.
166
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and that the defendant did not have facilities or property in the
district. 174 Although the defendant monitored and controlled many
billboards in the district through its surveillance computers, the court
opined that this activity in the district constituted a virtual space.175
Therefore, the distinction between physical and virtual space is still
viable because some businesses can operate from virtual spaces, such
as the defendant in this case. 176
B. Stand-Alone Offices and Secretarial Services
In Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Gilead Sciences,
Inc., 177 the defendant’s employees worked in the field visiting
healthcare providers about defendant’s products and drug therapies.178
In determining whether the defendant had a physical place of business
in the district, the court considered whether the defendant used its
employees’ homes to store literature or products or whether the homes
functioned as distribution centers to store inventory. 179 The court also
considered whether the defendant employed a secretarial service in the
district. 180 The court found that the defendant did not have a physical
place of business in the district because the defendant did not work
from a stand-alone office, store literature or products in its employees’
homes, or employ a secretarial service in the district. 181
If a defendant operates from a stand-alone office, the analysis
is simplified because a court can attach the physical place of business
requirement to the stand-alone office. 182 However, when a defendant
does not operate from a stand-alone office, a court must find a place to
which to attach the physical place of business requirement, such as an
employee’s home or a secretarial service’s place of business. 183 If
174

Lites Out, 2017 WL 5068348, at *4.
Id.
176 See id. at *2.
177 No. 16-CV-2915 (SRN/HB), 2017 WL 4773150 (D. Minn. October 20, 2017).
178 Id. at *2.
179 Id. at *5 (citing In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 735).
180 Id.
181 Id. at *6.
182 See generally Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., No. 2:17–cv–86, 2017
WL 4324841 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2017) (explaining that the defendant’s subsidiary had a retail
store in the district).
183 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360. Under this analysis, the court must consider whether
the defendant’s employee’s home amounts to the place of business of the defendant itself,
which is the third requirement that the Federal Circuit discussed in In re Cray. Id.
175
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venue policy did not allow courts to attach the physical place of
business requirement to such places, then a defendant could hide
behind its employees’ homes or secretarial service to avoid being
subject to litigation in a district. Although a defendant might operate
solely from its employees’ homes or secretarial service’s place of
business, venue policy should not enable a business to operate
vicariously through its employees’ homes. Therefore, to determine
whether a defendant has a physical place of business in a district, courts
should first consider whether the defendant operates from a standalone office. 184 In such cases where the defendant operates from its
employee’s home or secretarial service’s place of business, courts
should consider whether such places constitute the defendant’s
physical place of business as analyzed under the third requirement of
the Federal Circuit’s test in In re Cray. 185
Companies that have at least one stand-alone office in a judicial
district should be aware that such offices subject them to the wrath of
the dreaded patent troll. 186 Companies that have their employees work
from home or that utilize a secretarial service located in a judicial
district should be aware that such physical locations might satisfy the
“regular and established place of business” requirement, thereby
permitting a patent troll to bring suit in the judicial district. These
physical locations satisfy the physical place of business requirement of
the Federal Circuit’s definition from In re Cray. 187 However, courts
might not consider these locations the defendant’s place of business as
required by the Federal Circuit’s definition in In re Cray. 188 Although
this analysis might disfavor defendants, the Federal Circuit has found
that such physical locations comport with Congress’s intent when it
enacted the patent venue statute. 189 This analysis provides courts with
a platform for uniformly applying patent venue law, which can help
courts disarm the patent trolls and prevent them from forum shopping
for favorable forums, thereby fostering innovation.
184

See Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6.
See discussion of this requirement in In re Cray supra Section IV(B)(2); see also
discussion of this requirement infra Section VIII.
186 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016). These offices are physical, and courts can find them to
be regular and established depending on the circumstances.
187 An employee’s home and a secretarial service’s place of business can be considered
“building[s] or a part of building set apart for any purpose” or “quarters of any kind” as the
Federal Circuit defined the term “place” in In re Cray. In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
188 See id. at 1363.
189 See generally id. at 1355; In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 733.
185
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C. Foreign Registration and Registered Agents to Accept
Service of Process
In Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Systems, Inc., 190 the
court did not consider whether the defendant was registered as a
foreign corporation in the state or whether the defendant appointed a
registered agent to accept service of process in the state. 191 The court
reasoned that neither fact had any bearing on whether the defendant
maintained a physical place of business within the district. 192 The
court found that the consideration of the appointed agent was
“especially inappropriate because the patent venue statute was
intended to eliminate the abuses engendered by subjecting defendants
to suit wherever they could be served.” 193
The court’s holding in Symbology not only comports with
Congress’s intent when it created the patent venue statute, but it also
comports with Congress’s overall goal for implementing the patent
system. 194 By preventing a patent troll’s ability to bring an
infringement suit in any district where a defendant could be served,
courts can limit the dreaded troll’s ability to forum shop for any forum
in which the defendant has merely registered as a foreign corporation
or registered agents to accept service of process. By limiting the troll’s
ability to forum shop, companies can allocate resources on research
and development, thereby fostering innovation. 195

190 No. 2:17–cv–86, 2017 WL 4324841 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2017). The defendant was
registered as a foreign corporation in Virginia and appointed a registered agent to accept
service of process in Virginia. Id. at *9. The plaintiff argued that the courts should consider
these factors. Id. The plaintiff also argued that the defendant owned and operated three retail
stores in the district at issue. Id. at *10. However, the court found that the defendant did not
own and operate the retail stores but that the defendant’s parent company, Lego Retail Brand,
owned and operated the stores. Id.
191 Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841, at *9.
192 Id.
193 Id. See also BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., 2017 WL 5146008,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017) (explaining that “a defendant [] registered to do business in a
particular state has no bearing on whether it has the requisite ‘physical place’ of business in
the state, let alone in a particular judicial district.”). Perhaps a party could argue that the
defendant’s foreign registration represents that the defendant conducts business in the district,
but this argument likely has no merit because the party is conflating the issue of venue with
personal jurisdiction. See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361.
194 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
195 See Heinecke, supra note 2.
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DEFINING A “REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS”

Regarding the second requirement of the Federal Circuit’s
requirements, the Federal Circuit defined the terms “regular” and
“established” and explained that the two terms have different
meanings. 196 However, most courts analyze both requirements using
the same facts without explaining whether their analysis pertains to the
regular place of business requirement or the established place of
business requirement. 197 Courts make it difficult to ascertain whether
they are analyzing the regular or established requirement of the Federal
Circuit’s test because they combine the analysis for the two different
requirements. 198 Instead, courts should separately analyze the regular
requirement and the established requirement because the two terms
have different meanings. 199 Therefore, this Note separates the factual
consideration for the regular requirement and the established
requirement. To determine whether a defendant has a regular place of
business in a district, a court should consider how long the defendant
has spent in the district as well as how frequently the defendant comes
to the district.200 This section will discuss and analyze facts that courts
should consider when determining whether a defendant has a regular
place of business in a district.
A. Defendant’s Time Spent in the District
In Phillips v. Baker, 201 the defendants allegedly infringed
plaintiff’s patent when they used plaintiff’s patented apparatus to
complete precooling services for agricultural shippers. 202 In many
196

See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360.
See id. at 1364-65.
198 See Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *5-6 (explaining that even though the defendant
employed a sales force of approximately a dozen people over a two-year period in the district,
the court found that the defendant’s presence in the district was not regular and established
because the physical location of the sales force was not fixed permanently). The court in
Regents combined the “regular” and “established” requirements of the second requirement and
did not discuss whether the two-year period was sufficient for a court to consider it regular.
See id.
199 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362-63 (defining regular as “‘steady[,] uniform[,] orderly[,
and] methodical’ manner” and defining established as “settle[d] certainly, or fix[ed]
permanently”). Courts should split the analysis to avoid redundancy and conflating the
requirements of each term because the Federal Circuit has defined the terms separately.
200 See discussion of these factors infra Sections VI(A)-(B).
201 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941).
202 Id. at 754.
197
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widely separated agricultural districts in the United States, the shippers
needed defendants’ services for only a few weeks of the year. 203 The
defendants travelled from one agricultural district to another each
season to secure business at the shippers’ premises and perform the
precooling operations. 204 Upon procurement of a contract, defendants
installed the patented apparatus to perform the precooling service and
then removed it once it finished the service. 205 The court reasoned that
the defendants merely conducted the precooling services on a box car
temporarily standing at a railroad siding, whereby the car was there
one day and gone the next. 206 The court found that the shippers’
premises constituted a temporary place of business and was just a
location for a particular transaction. 207
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Phillips comports with the
Federal Circuit’s definition of regular. 208 The defendant’s presence at
the shippers’ premises was merely sporadic and temporary; it was not
steady, uniform, orderly, or methodical as required by the Federal
Circuit’s definition. 209 One might argue that the defendant’s presence
in the district each season was a steady, uniform, orderly, and
methodical presence because the defendants came back each season.
However, this argument would likely fail because the defendants could
have been in the district only once on any given day in any given
season, which indicates that the defendant’s presence in the district
was sporadic, temporary, unsteady, disorderly, and unmethodical. 210
However, if the defendant was in the district each season for days,
weeks, or months at a time, perhaps the defendant’s presence was more
than sporadic or temporary and thus orderly, uniform, and methodical.

203

Id.
Id.
205 Id.
206 Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756 (explaining that the place of business was where the business
was carried on regularly, not merely temporarily, or for some special work or particular
transaction).
207 Id.
208 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
209 See id.
210 In fact, this argument failed in Phillips. Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756. The “[a]ppellants
complain[ed] that from an equitable standpoint[,] judgment in [the] case should be in their
favor because the appellees ‘jump[ed] about the country like fleas, and nowhere in the record
of [the] case or elsewhere [was] there a statement which would [have bound] them in a
substitute action as to where, if anywhere, a suit against them [could have been] maintained.’”
Id.
204
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Therefore, courts should consider the amount of time that a defendant
spends in the district over a period of years. 211
In Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Tietex International,
Ltd., 212 the defendant manufactured and sold a broad range of fabrics
nationwide, including some using plaintiff’s patented flame-retardant
fabric. 213 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had a regular place
of business because the defendant’s regional sales manager “lived and
worked out of the same home office located within the district for a
period of over twenty years, using part of his home as a sales office.” 214
Although the court opined that it was highly doubtful that the
defendant had a physical, regular or established place of business in
the district, the court focused the entirety of its analysis on the third
requirement of the venue test, which asks whether the place of business
is that of the defendant’s and not the defendant’s employee.215
However, in contrast to this court’s analysis, courts have considered a
twenty-year presence in a district to constitute a regular place of
business for venue purposes. 216 The employee’s presence in the
district in Precision seems to be regular because it was steady, orderly,
uniform, and methodical as required by the Federal Circuit.217
Therefore, the court in Precision should have found that the
employee’s presence in the district was at least regular.
The court in Regents did not focus any of its analysis on the
regular place of business requirement. 218 The court merely noted that
the defendant employed a sales force of approximately a dozen people
over at least a two-year period, but did not analyze this fact regarding
the regular place of business requirement. 219 The court found that the
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business
because the physical location of the sales force was not permanently
fixed. 220 Similar to the court in Precision, this court focused its
211 Courts should determine whether a defendant’s presence in a district is temporary on a
case-by-case basis because a bright-line test might not be fair and equitable in all cases.
212 No. 1:13-cv-645, 2017 WL 5176355 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2017).
213 Id. at *2.
214 Id. at *11.
215 Id.
216 See Stiegele v. Jacques Kreisler Mfg. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 494, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(holding that venue was proper in the district for a defendant that maintained an office in the
district for twenty years).
217 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
218 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *5-6.
219 Id.
220 Id. at *6.
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analysis on the established place of business requirement instead of the
regular place of business requirement. 221 However, the court
acknowledged that the period of the defendant’s alleged presence in
the district is dispositive for a regular place of business analysis. 222
Therefore, courts should consider the amount of time that a defendant
spends in a district to determine if its presence is regular.
By analyzing the defendant’s time spent in the judicial district,
defendants that operate for a short period of time in a judicial district,
perhaps to perform a precooling service, 223 need not surrender to the
dreaded patent trolls’ intimidation tactics. By avoiding the troll’s
tactics, defendants can spend money on research and development as
opposed to litigation strategies, which supports Congress’s intent when
it enacted the patent venue statute. 224 The time that a defendant has
spent in a district can be a fact-sensitive inquiry, 225 and each case
should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. By analyzing the
defendant’s time spent in the district, courts can more uniformly define
the extent to which a defendant has a regular place of business in a
district, thereby limiting a patent troll’s ability to forum shop for
favorable forums. Such a limitation on forum shopping allows
companies to allocate resources to fostering innovation as opposed to
defending against the litigious patent trolls. 226
B. Frequency of Defendant’s Presence
In Lites Out, the defendant sold surveillance computers to
billboard owners, such as plaintiff, to track billboard structural
integrity and detect defects as they arose. 227 The plaintiff argued that
the residences of the defendant’s employees and independent
contractors constituted regular and established places of business. 228
The court rejected the argument because none of the defendant’s
employees or independent contractors resided in the district. 229 In fact,
221

Id. at *5-6.
Id.
223 See Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756.
224 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355.
225 See generally Phillips, 121 F.2d at 752; Precision, 2017 WL 5176355, at *1.
226 See Heinecke, supra note 2.
227 Lites Out, 2017 WL 5068348, at *2. See discussion of the facts of the case supra Section
V(A).
228 Lites Out, 2017 WL 5068348, at *4.
229 Id.
222
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the court found that one independent contractor spent most of the year
outside of the district at issue. 230 The court concluded that the
defendant did not have a regular place of business under § 1400(b)
because the independent contractor was not frequently in the district. 231
Similarly, in Phillips, the defendants travelled from one
agricultural district to another each season to secure business at the
shippers’ premises and perform precooling operations for the
shippers. 232 The court reasoned that the defendants merely conducted
the precooling services on a boxcar temporarily standing at a railroad
siding. 233 The court found that the shippers’ premises constituted a
temporary place of business and was just a location for a particular
transaction because the defendant was within the district for only a few
weeks per year. 234
Courts should consider the frequency with which a defendant
operates a place of business in a district because it shows whether the
place of business is steady, uniform, orderly, and methodical, which
comports with the Federal Circuit’s definition of regular. 235 For
example, some businesses might not operate every single day within a
district. These businesses might not necessarily be sporadically or
temporarily in the district because they might operate for a week each
month. Operating twelve times each year may make their conduct in
the district regular because it is steady, uniform, orderly, and
methodical in nature. 236 If courts determine that these businesses do
not have a regular place of business in a district, then this determination
might entice other businesses to operate in a similar manner to avoid
being subject to litigation in the district. However, venue policy
should not enable businesses to change their business practices to
avoid being subject to litigation in a particular district. Therefore,
courts should consider the frequency with which a defendant operates

230

Id.
Id. The court relied mostly on the fact that the surveillance computers constituted virtual
spaces. Id. at *4. See also CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design, No. 4:16-cv-00482DCN, 2017 WL 4556717, at *3 (D. Idaho October 11, 2017) (reasoning that the defendant’s
sales representatives were not based in the district and visited it only occasionally).
232 Phillips, 121 F.2d at 754. See discussion of the facts of the case supra Section VI(A).
233 Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756 (explaining that the place of business was where the business
was carried on regularly, not merely temporarily, or for some special work or particular
transaction). The court also explained that the box was there one day and gone the next. Id.
234 Id.
235 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.
236 See id.
231
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a place of business in a district to determine whether the defendant’s
place of business is regular. 237
VII.

DEFINING AN “ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS”

In In re Cray, the Federal Circuit explained that a business is
“established” if it is “not transient,” “settle[d] certainly, or fix[ed]
permanently.” 238 However, the court did not discuss factors to
determine whether a defendant has an established place of business in
the district. 239 In making this determination, courts should consider
the defendant’s revenue generated in the district, the time that the
defendant has spent in the district, and the number of employees that
the defendant has employed in the district. 240 On the other hand, courts
should not consider whether the defendant’s employees service
customers at the customer’s location 241 or whether a defendant’s place
of business is permanently fixed to a physical location as being
determinative. 242 This section will discuss and analyze facts that courts
should consider when determining whether a defendant has an
established place of business in a district.
A. Fixed Permanence
In Regents, the court explained that the defendant’s place of
business was not established because the defendant’s sales force of
approximately a dozen people over at least a two-year period was not
permanently fixed to a physical location. 243 However, by requiring a
defendant’s place of business to be physical, the court conflated the
two separate requirements that the place of business be “physical” as
opposed to “established.” Although a physical location is likely a good
indication that the business has an established place of business in a
district, courts should not rely on this fact to be determinative. For
example, a business’s employees could live in one district and work in

237
238
239
240
241
242
243

See Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756.
In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
See discussion of the shortcomings of this case supra Section IV(B)(2).
See discussion of these factors infra Section VII(B), VII(E).
See discussion of this factor infra Section VII(C).
See discussion of this factor infra Section VII(A).
Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6.
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a different district. 244 If courts adopted the reasoning in Regents, then
the business would only have an established place of business in the
district where the employees live because the employees are
permanently fixed to a physical location there, the physical location
being their homes. 245 However, venue should be determined based on
a defendant’s place of business in the district where its employees
work. In this example, the defendant might not necessarily have a
physical place of business in the district where the employees work,
but the physical place of business requirement should be evaluated
using the law set forth in In re Cray and the factors set forth in Section
V. 246 Therefore, although courts require that a defendant have a
physical place of business in a district for venue purposes, courts
should not rely solely on a physical place of business to determine
whether a defendant has an established place of business in a district. 247
B. Revenue Generated in District
Several courts have determined that revenue generated from a
district should not be part of the venue analysis. 248 In Regents and
CAO Lighting, rather than rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that the
defendant had an established place of business from the revenue that it
generated in the district, the courts found that this revenue did not
create established places of business in each case. 249 In Regents, the
court explained that “the Federal Circuit was apparently unpersuaded
that even higher sales figures than the amounts noted here, indicated a
regular and established place of business.” 250 In CAO Lighting, instead
of rejecting outright the plaintiff’s argument regarding the defendant’s

244 For venue purposes, the employee’s residence is important because courts often consider
whether the employee’s home constitutes the defendant’s place of business. See In re Cray,
871 F.3d at 1363. See also discussion of the Federal Circuit’s third requirement in In re Cray
supra Section IV(B)(2).
245 This reasoning does not comport with the venue statute itself because the pertinent
“place” for venue purposes is the place of business and not the place of the employees. See In
re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1364.
246 See discussion of the physical place of business requirement supra Section V.
247 See Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6.
248 See Patent Holder, 2017 WL 5032989, at *6 (explaining that revenue derived from the
forum has no bearing on whether § 1400(b)’s physical place requirements are met). See also
Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841, at *9.
249 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *2; CAO Lighting, 2017 WL 4556717, at *3.
250 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6. The court did not discuss what the sales figures
generated from the district were. Id.
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revenue generated in the district, the court acknowledged that this
revenue did not change the analysis and was of little significance. 251
Courts should analyze the defendant’s sales figures generated
from the district because some businesses’ entire sales force consists
of sales representatives working from home offices. Although a sales
representative’s home might not amount to a place of business of the
defendant, 252 the sales representative could potentially generate a large
portion of the business’s revenue from that district. As long as a sales
representative continues to generate significant revenue from a district,
courts should consider the sales representative settled certainly and
fixed permanently there. 253 If venue policy does not allow courts to
analyze the revenue that a defendant generates in a district, then a
defendant could hide behind its sales force in the district to avoid being
subject to litigation there. Venue policy should not enable a business
to conduct business vicariously through its sales force. Therefore,
courts should consider the defendant’s revenue generated from the
district.
Although some courts do not analyze a defendant’s revenue
generated in a district, 254 companies should still be aware that, whether
or not courts agree, such generation falls within the Federal Circuit’s
definition of “established” in In re Cray. 255 Although these defendants
might not necessarily have a physical place of business in the district,
a defendant’s revenue generation in a district can be construed as the
defendant’s intent to be settled certainly or fixed permanently there. 256
In such circumstances, companies should be particularly careful in
setting up physical places of business so that they do not
unintentionally expose themselves to patent infringement litigation,
especially litigation against a dreaded patent troll.

251

CAO Lighting, 2017 WL 4556717, at *3.
See discussion of the employee’s home constituting the defendant’s place of business
supra Section IV(B)(2) and infra Section VIII.
253 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
254 See Patent Holder, 2017 WL 5032989, at *6. See also Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841,
at *9.
255 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363 (defining established as settled certainly or fixed
permanently).
256 See id.
252
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C. Service at Customer’s Location
In Regents, the court found that the defendant did not have an
established place of business because the defendant’s employees
serviced customers at the customer’s location. 257 Although the
defendant’s employees serviced customers in the district through visits
to healthcare facilities or clinical trial facilities, the court reasoned that
the “servicing occur[red] at the customer’s physical place, not
[defendant’s].” 258 Therefore, the court found that the defendant did not
have an established place of business in the district. 259 However, the
court’s analysis of this fact under the established requirement seems
flawed.
Even though a defendant’s employees might service customers
at the customer’s locations, the defendant might have a non-transient,
certainly settled, and permanently fixed presence in a district directly
through its employees’ conduct. 260 For example, in Regents, the
defendant’s employees visited healthcare facilities and clinical trial
facilities to work with customers. 261 The fact that the defendant’s
employees go to the customer’s place instead of the customers going
to the defendant’s employees’ place should have no bearing on the
established requirement. Rather, courts should consider whether the
services performed in the district are non-transient, certainly settled,
and permanently fixed in the district consistent with the Federal
Circuit’s definition in In re Cray. 262 For example, if for one year the
defendant serviced all customers in the district from the customer’s
physical place and the next year serviced no customers in the district,
then a court should find that the defendant’s business was not
established in the district because the defendant left the district and,
therefore, its presence is certainly not fixed permanently. Therefore,
courts should focus on the transitory nature of the defendant’s place of
business and not focus on the defendant’s employees servicing
customers from the customer’s physical place. 263 By focusing on the
transitory nature of the defendant’s place of business, courts can more

257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6.
Id.
Id.
See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *2.
See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
See id.
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uniformly apply patent venue law, which limits a patent troll’s ability
to forum shop for a favorable forum. By limiting their ability to utilize
forum shopping as a litigation weapon, instead of focusing on
defensive litigation strategies, companies can spend money on creating
patented inventions, thereby fostering innovation in accordance with
Congress’s intent when it established the patent system. 264
D. Employee or Independent Contractor
In Talsk, the defendant operated a program in which residents
of the district, called Community Members, could sell the defendant’s
product as independent contractors. 265 Although the Community
Members did not receive a salary, the defendant provided financial
incentives in the form of bonuses to Community Members who
recommended products in the course of conducting their own
business. 266 The court reasoned that the Community Members’
activities on behalf of the defendant were not “sufficiently stable or
established to be seen as the operation of Defendant’s business in this
District.” 267 The court found that the defendant’s presence was not
established in the district because the Community Members were
independent contractors. 268 Even if one of the Community Members
was very successful and the defendant gave substantial bonuses to that
Community Member, the analysis would not change because the
defendant lacked the “necessary control over its Community
Members.” 269 If the defendant had paid the Community Members a
salary, rather than a bonus, then the analysis would change because the
Community Members could be deemed employees of the defendant. 270
It would be fundamentally unfair to allow patent trolls to bring
patent infringement suits against defendants in districts where the
defendant’s only connection is through an independent contractor. If
such conduct were permitted, patent trolls could file patent
infringement suits in any district where a defendant uses any
independent contractor, which could subject the defendant to patent

264
265
266
267
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See Heinecke, supra note 2.
Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *3.
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Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *3.
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litigation is an overwhelming number of judicial districts. This
exacerbates the problem with patent trolls exploiting the weaknesses
in the patent system and certainly goes against Congress’s intent of
limiting patent infringement suits being “brought in any district in
which the defendant could be served.” 271 Moreover, companies would
be required to allocate an overwhelming amount of resources to
defensive litigation strategies because of the patent troll’s ability to file
suit anywhere that the defendant has conducted business with any
independent contractor. 272 Such an allocation of resources can be quite
expensive, harms innovation 273 and directly conflicts with Congress’s
intent for implementing the patent system. 274
Therefore, by
determining whether a defendant has an employee or an independent
contractor in a district, courts can more uniformly apply patent venue
law and restrict a patent troll’s ability to utilize forum shopping as a
litigation weapon.
E. Time Spent and Workforce Present in the District
In Regents, the defendant employed a sales force of
approximately a dozen people over at least a two-year period within
the district. 275 The court reasoned that the defendant did not require
that its employees live in the district and found that the physical
location of the sales force was not permanently fixed.276
Consequently, the court found that the physical location of the sales
force did not constitute an established place of business. 277 The court’s
reliance on the combination of the defendant’s time spent in the district
and number of employees within the district comports with the Federal
Circuit’s definition of established. 278 Accordingly, the defendant’s
time spent in the district indicates whether the defendant’s presence in
the district is settled certainly and fixed permanently. 279 In addition, a
greater number of employees present within the district suggests that
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In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Schnell, 365 U.S. at 262).
See Heinecke, supra note 2.
See Heinecke, supra note 2.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6.
Id.
Id.
See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
See id.
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the defendant likely intends to establish its business in the district and
therefore intends to be fixed permanently there. 280
VIII. DEFINING DEFENDANT’S “PLACE OF BUSINESS”
In In re Cray, the Federal Circuit articulated that the place of
business must be of the defendant and not solely a place of the
The court indicated that relevant
defendant’s employee. 281
considerations include whether the defendant owns or leases the place
or whether the defendant exercises other attributes of possession or
control over the place. 282 The court also discussed that other
considerations may satisfy the place of business requirement, such as
whether the defendant conditioned employment on an employee’s
continued residence in the district or the employee stores materials at
the place so that they can be distributed or sold from that location.283
In In re Cray, the court acknowledged that potential relevant inquiries
include whether the defendant lists the alleged place of business on a
website, in a telephone or other directory, or places its name on a sign
on or associated with the building itself. 284 The court indicated that a
further consideration might be the nature and activity of the alleged
place of business in the district in comparison with that of defendant’s
other places of business in other venues. 285 This section will discuss
and analyze other facts that courts should consider when determining
whether a place of business in a district is the defendant’s.
These factors from In re Cray, in addition to the several factors
discussed in this Section, allow courts to more uniformly determine
whether a place of business is that of the defendant. By utilizing these
factors, courts prevent patent trolls from utilizing forum shopping as a
litigation weapon, thereby discouraging them to continue exploiting
the weaknesses of the patent system. Accordingly, companies can
allocate resources on research and development instead of costly
litigation practices designed to fend off patent trolls. By allocating
resources to research and development, companies can foster
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In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.
Id. at 1364-65.
Id. at 1365.
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innovation, which supports Congress’s intent for creating the patent
system in the first place. 286
A. Storing Products in Employee’s Home
In In re Cray, Cray’s sales executive did not store petitioner’s
samples or products in his home. 287 The court reasoned that storage
was not possible because Cray’s supercomputer systems could take up
entire rooms and weighed several thousand pounds. 288 Although a
defendant’s storing its inventory in its employee’s home favors the
employee’s home constituting the defendant’s place of business, 289
courts should not treat this fact as being determinative. If the defendant
stores its inventory in the employee’s home, then the employee’s home
likely constitutes the defendant’s place of business. 290 However, if the
defendant cannot store the inventory in its employee’s home because
of the product’s size or weight, courts should analyze other attributes
that contribute to the employee’s home constituting the defendant’s
place of business. 291
B. Separate Corporate Entities
In cases where the defendant’s subsidiary conducts business in
a district, courts should consider whether the subsidiary owns and
operates its business as a separate corporate entity from the
defendant. 292 For a plaintiff to impute venue onto a defendant through
a defendant’s subsidiary, courts should inquire whether the defendant
and its subsidiary lack formal separateness. 293 For example, in
Symbology, because the defendant and its subsidiary in the district kept
separate general ledgers, prepared their own distinct financial reports,
286

See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1365.
288 Id.
289 See id.
290 See In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737.
291 See, Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *5.
292 Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841, at *10.
293 Id. (explaining “when separate, but closely related, corporations are involved . . . the rule
is similar to that applied for purposes of service of process. So long as a formal separation of
the entities is preserved, the courts ordinarily will not treat the place of business of one
corporation as the place of business of the other. On the other hand, if the corporations
disregard their separateness and act as a single enterprise, they may be treated as one for
purposes of venue.”).
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and had separate assets, the court found the defendant and its
subsidiary were separate corporate entities. 294 The court found that the
subsidiary’s retail stores in the district were not imputable to the
defendant, and the court held that the place of business in the district
was not the defendant’s place of business. 295 Therefore, in the case of
a plaintiff’s establishing venue through a defendant’s subsidiary,
courts should consider whether the subsidiary owns and operates its
business as a separate corporate entity from the defendant. 296
C. Worker’s Compensation Insurance Policies
In BillingNetwork, the plaintiff argued that the even if the
defendant did not establish its employees’ homes as its own places of
business, it ratified them as such by designating the homes for purposes
of worker’s compensation. 297 The court reasoned that the argument
was not persuasive because the listing of the employee’s home address
on the worker’s compensation insurance policy showed neither that the
defendant possessed the home, controlled the home, nor held out the
home as its place of business to the public. 298 The court found that the
listing of the employee’s home for the worker’s compensation
insurance policy merely recognized that the employee did work for the
employer at its home. 299
IX.

CONCLUSION

Courts should continue to disarm patent trolls by uniformly
applying patent venue law to prevent them from using forum shopping
as a litigation weapon. Companies continue to increase spending on
defensive litigation strategies, which leads to decreased spending on
research and development. 300 This shift in resources harms innovation,
which frustrates Congress’s goal for implementing the United States
patent system. 301 Although the Federal Circuit’s guidance on venue
disputes helped district courts apply patent venue law uniformly, the
294
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Federal Circuit left large gaps in its analysis of the requirements. 302
These gaps in the patent venue law have given wide discretion to the
district courts, and, as a result, the district courts have ruled differently
on several of the requirements. 303 Such varying views and opinions
enable patent trolls to continue to exploit the weaknesses in the patent
system and use forum shopping as a litigation advantage.
By utilizing the factors analyzed in this Note, courts can begin
to apply patent venue law uniformly to prevent patent trolls from forum
shopping. Chef from the Disney movie Trolls said, “He who controls
the trolls controls the kingdom . . . !” 304 It is time for our courts to
control patent trolls by controlling the kingdom, the kingdom being
patent venue jurisprudence. It is time for our courts to put an end to
the forum shopping and extinguish the dreaded troll. It is time to
control the kingdom!
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See discussion of the shortcomings of this case supra Section IV(B)(2).
See discussion of the analysis of each requirement supra Sections V-VIII.
304 KingdomHeartsFan3211, You’re a dude??? – Trolls, YouTube, (June 2, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcXQG9IGcP0
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